MCO 03 GO TO WORK NOW, MR. ARCHITECT!
Having to term with the 3rd installments of the extended[i] MCO[ii] with certain services sectors such as the “professional services related to the construction industry including architects […]” allowed to conditionally operate, under a statutory-undertakings to “comply strictly to all requirements from MITI[iii], KKM[iv], MKN[v] and relevant agencies and applicable laws and regulations in this nationwide MCO and Covid19 public health and safety crisis period” In other words, it is important for architects to understand the liabilities annexed to these undertakings while keeping ‘your finger crossed that nothing bad actually happened while in operation’. When such ‘undertakings’ are required, it simply means to say, ‘you are on your own and whatever you do in the contrary will be against the public policy’ as in the advisory, “ACPs are cautioned that should any of the staff gets infected by Covid-19 during work, MITI shall require for the whole office operations to be shut down immediately. The company will be responsible to bear all costs related to addressing the infection. It may involve the costs of testing and to quarantine the staff in contact with the infected person as directed by KKM, and other relevant government authorities.” The same is applied to the contractor, while the developer is ‘off the hook’, due to the ‘indemnity clause’ in most Building Contract, notably the PAM Form[vi].
The recent issuance of PAM advisories[vii] are interesting on twofold. Foremost, “PAM would advise that individual Architectural Consultancy Practices (ACP) shall carefully make their own decision to consider the urgency and readiness of their practice to re-commence work”, the question most ACP would have asked, since when did PAM given a ‘statutory might’, unlike the Board of Architects LAM, to sanction ACP when to commence, halt and re-commence work? The onus is for PAM to collectively obtain a ‘blanket permit’ from MITI for its member to re-commence work. Whether the respective ACP would actually do so are entirely their choices, since a majority of the ACP are ‘small fries’ sole proprietors[viii] that do not employ a huge battalion of workers. Second, “PAM Council wishes to reiterate and emphasize our advice to continue to ‘Work From Home’ as far as possible if there is no urgent and/or essential work that are needed to be performed in the office and/or site”, in contrast to the first advisory, a ‘firm stand’ by saying, ‘no thank you, Mr. PM’, should have been taken, not to say that ‘Work From Home’ is a choice, rather a necessity.
Assuming that the choice of ‘readiness of their practice to re-commence work’ has been made by reasons of ‘pressures’ from ‘whosoever with vested interest’, the recommended guidelines from PAM are rather ‘interesting’ with significant impact to the building construction contract with particular, the PAM Form with regard to additional cost, loss and expenses L&E, regardless if the “Construction works below the value of RM500,000 whereby the main contractors are G1-G2 as certified by CIDB”. The contractor has to remodel the entire construction site with ‘Clean’ and ‘Unclean’ zones. ‘Disinfection Bay’ would have to be considered. Such remodeling of the entire site is no easy task.
Another interesting aspect of the advisory is “PAM reiterates that unless absolutely necessary, the Architect or Principal Submitting Person PSP, Resident Architect and Clerk-of-Work should monitor the project site remotely as much as possible”, application of CCTV and drone for supervision have to be in place and to be provided by the contractor, at whose cost, since these were not reflected in the preliminaries nor the contract? Remember, it was also PAM’s advisory for architects to consider such MCO as force majeure in the evaluation of EOT, having it as ‘neutral event’ that does not entitle the contractor to L&E. Wonder what happened if the area has no or weak WiFi coverage? Wonder if ‘remote supervision’ correspond to the purpose or intention of the UBBL 1984[ix] or s.70(21) SBDA 1974[x] such as “supervise the erection of the building to ensure that the erection is in conformity with the approved plans and the requirements of the provisions of this Act or any by-laws made thereunder”? How is such ‘remote supervision’ works out in terms of ‘professional negligence’ and ‘indemnity insurance coverage’ have yet to be ascertained? Remember, architects can be sued for many reasons.
Assuming that all the additional SOP[xi] is in place and the site has been remodeled with clean/unclean zones with disinfection bays in placed and all workers had to be placed in site with proper designated workers quarters, how are these workers going to don the PPE[xii] against ‘bio hazard’ with PPE against ‘construction hazard’, having to work under the ‘most unforgiving’ environment of the construction site and at the same time, observing the ‘social distancing’? What happen if the cause of the accident is the use of the PPE itself?
While most of the ACP would be having trouble logging into MITI’s webpage[xiii] to apply for the permit, in the absent of CIDB[xiv] clear guidelines and architect’s busy giving ‘instruction’ via ‘social media’, an obvious observations are these ‘written messages’ can be construed as ‘instruction[xv]’ in the eye of the law and any ‘well informed’ contractor will just have to ‘write back[xvi]’ to confirm such instruction.
While considering PAM’s advisory to be worthy, a note of thank had to be accorded to the PAM’s President’s Advisory[xvii], namely “[…] Like our civil servants […] working late into the night and through weekends to address this Covid-19 public health crisis and imminent economic challenges, PAM is also working hard to help our Architects to prevail through these difficult times”.
Having wrote these as a personal reflection or opinion, not as a ‘lawyer’ or a legal counsel, as disclaimer, never take this writing of mine, to be your ‘legal advice’. You should seek appropriate ‘legal advice’ for your own situation. I am not liable for the accuracy of facts and representation on this writing.
[i] Announcement by YAB Prime Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin on Friday 10 April 2020 to extend the MCO to 28 April 2020.
[ii] Movement Control Order MCO
[iii] Ministry of International Trade and Industry MITI
[iv] Ministry of Health KKM
[v] National Security Council MKN
[vi] Cl.7.1 PAM 2006
[vii] < https://mcusercontent.com/0f61e9c943c635f9ec3649f2a/files/c1507238-7e9f-4084-a23f-2b923b1d5a2e/PAM_Advisory_for_ACPs_on_operating_permit_to_resume_work_FINAL.pdf>
[ix] Uniform Building ByLaws 1984
[x] Street Building and Drainage Act 1974
[xi] Standard Operating Procedure SOP
[xii] Personal Protection Equipment PPE
[xiv] Construction Industry Development Board CIDB
[xv] Cl.2.0 PAM 2006
[xvi] Art.7(0) CAI, Cl2.2(a) PAM2006
[xvii] < https://mcusercontent.com/0f61e9c943c635f9ec3649f2a/files/12cdc8a9-c336-4315-ac54-137ac3c33402/PAM_Advisory_cover_ltr_PAM_President_14Apr2020.pdf>
[UPDATE - 02]: It was reported by the AIAC that CIPAA has overtaken arbitration in the feedstock of cases in the construction law. Notwithstanding its popularity, the nature of CIPAA has invited many criticism for the obvious lacked of ‘refined-justice’, warrants for a much delayed reform. Such ‘conundrum’ pushed the boundary of CIPAA adjudication, even season adjudicators are confused as to the application of the law in adjudication, thus this paper attempt to address the ‘latest development’ as per 2021, in the application of the law in adjudication.
 AIAC Annual Report 2019-2020: Oct 2021, 200 reported cases in the HC; 2020, 100 reported cases in the HC; 537 cases registered with the AIAC.
 <https://www.aiac.world/events/398/PUBLIC-FORUM:-REFORMS-TO-THE-CONSTRUCTION-INDUSTRY-PAYMENT-AND-ADJUDICATION-ACT-2012>, accessed 22 Mar 2022
Following the birth of a statutory adjudication scheme in the UK under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996[i] (the “1996 UK Act”), on 1 June 2015, many countries within the commonwealth had taken the similar bold steps to enact the similar Security of Payment Legislation SOPL within their own legislation. Fundamentally SOPL, as its name suggested, is a piece of legislation to ensure that payment to the contractors are secured as payment is a fundamental ‘life-line’ to any business of construction, without it the entire machinery of construction will collapse and such will create detrimental ripple effects to both the downstream and upstream of the economy. In a nutshell, the theory behind SOPL is to ‘pay first, argue later’ based on ‘rough justice’ with legally binding decision that has no ‘finality’ thus providing only temporal relief.
Prior to the eventful year of 2012, the Pertubuhan Arkitek Malaysia (PAM) has taken the initial steps to initiate a version of the SOPL for the Malaysian construction industry owing to the fact that via its collaborations with various stakeholders, especially with the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), various issues pertaining to non-payments to the contractors had been raised. A joint working committee has been deployed to draft the framework for this SOPL. As the matter at hand, was largely attributed to the issues faced by contractors, it was naturally befitting CIDB to take the lead[ii]. This effort has since, taken a setback when the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) as it was known then before it was rebranded as the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC), has taken the ‘idea’ and forged ahead to be passed and enacted in the Parliament as the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA 2012), enforced in 2014, adopting the New Zealand’s Security of Payment Legislation model (NZ Act)[iii] with modification to suit ‘document only’, ‘fast track’ and ‘chess time’ procedural. Unlike other commonwealth jurisdictions, the CIPAA 2012 has the term ‘Adjudication’ included as the only statutory means to dispense ‘rough justice’ in recouping any unpaid claims in the construction industry, virtually monopolize by the AIAC as the sole appointing body[iv].
In the beginning, any claims put forth by the claimant, in CIPAA, will stand an 80% chances of winning due to its ‘rough justice stance’ with no ‘finality’. ‘I will CIPAA you’, became the common phrase in town. The ‘fast and furious’ approach in dispensing rough justice via CIPAA has received various challenges in the Courts of law, notably with regards to the following issues: -
1) PROSPECTIVE OR RETROSPECTIVE?
Question, can CIPAA applies retrospectively or prospectively? Came 2015, as in UDA Holdings Bhd vs Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd, CIPAA applies retrospectively[v] and take precedents over any contractual provisions that state otherwise nullified any substantive rights under the pre-existing contract agreements. However, this High Court’s decisions were later in 2018, overturned by the Court of Appeal as in the Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd vs Jack-In Pile (M) Sdn Bhd that held, the CIPAA applies prospectively and not retrospectively[vi]. What this judgment meant was, any applicable construction contracts that were entered into prior to 15th April 2014 would not be subjected to the operation of CIPAA. This matter has yet to be challenged in the Federal Court.
[Updated]: In 2019 the Federal Court, as per the ‘Jack-In Pile’ appeal, had ruled that CIPAA could only apply prospectively, i.e. it applies only to construction contracts executed after 15th April 2014, based on the following reasoning that unless expressly stated otherwise, the absence of an express provision, which can only be enacted by Parliament, CIPAA cannot operate to a construction contract entered into before such date. As a result the AIAC will no longer register payment disputes arising from construction contracts executed before 15th April 2014.
[Updated-02]: The FC puts an end to this long-haul debate, by holding that CIPAA to be applied ‘Prospectively’. Prospectively means CIPAA applies only to construction contracts executed after 15th April 2014 and not before. The ratio is that if Parliament intended such to be applied retrospectively, it has to be expressly state so. The ruling in Jack-In Pile is taken even further, where even though the main contract was entered upon before 15 Apr 2014, but the sub-contract entered after this date is subject to the application of CIPAA. The prospective application is brought even further, to apply if there were material changes to the contract past the effective date of 15 Apr 2014. Such also include the application of ‘agreement to novate’.
 Jack-In Pile (M) Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd  1 CLJ 299
 Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd And Another Case  MLJU 2308
 Naim Engineering v WCP Engineering  MLJU 2059
 Encorp Iskandar Development Sdn Bhd v. Konsortium Ipmines Merz Sdn Bhd  1 LNS 1129
2) CONTRACTING OUT OF CIPAA?
Question, can parties contracting out (opt-out) of CIPAA based on the doctrine of ‘free-to contract’? In Ranhill E&C Sdn Bhd vs Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd  and it was held that the terms of CIPAA as a legislation prohibits the parties from contracting out of its application, notwithstanding that there is no express-term within the Act. Any forms of contractual arrangement for dispute resolution would not exclude the application of CIPAA.
3) STAY OF ADJUDICATION DECISION?
Question, can parties apply for the stay of an adjudication decision? In Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd vs Arcradius Sdn Bhd , it was held that a party seeking to stay a CIPAA decision under section 16 must show credible evidence that the financial impecuniosity on the part of the other party, being the sole “exceptional circumstances” that the probable inability of repayment of the adjudicated sum that may follow from concurrent court or arbitration proceedings. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court and the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The Court retains the discretion as to whether or not to grant a stay.
4) PRE-QUALIFICATION FOR STAY
Question, can parties pre-qualify for the stay of an adjudication decision? In Foster Wheeler E & C (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd vs Arkema Thiochemicals Sdn Bhd & Another Case , the Claimant sought to enforce the CIPAA decision while the Respondent wanted to apply for a stay but cannot fulfil the condition for a stay of an adjudication decision due to the elaborate multi-tiered dispute resolutions. It was held that the expression of ‘pending final determination by arbitration or the court’, which is a condition for a stay of an adjudication decision under section 16(1)(b) of CIPAA, requires the parties to have commenced arbitration or court proceedings. For such, arbitration cases in PAM has been increased by leaps and folds, to pre-qualify for the stay of an adjudication decision.
5) CONDITIONAL PAYMENT
Question, can a party imposed a payment condition to another party as a reason of non-payment? A very common pay when paid, pay if paid or any form of back to back payment, probably known as conditional payment clause that is found in most construction contract, notably with regard to clause 25.4(d) of the PAM 2006 Form. Section 35(1) of CIPAA prohibits conditional payment terms and provides that a conditional payment provision in a construction contract is void. In BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd vs Merger Insight (M) Sdn Bhd , the plaintiff in its application to set aside an adjudication decision, argued that it was not bound to make any further payment to the defendant until a final account is determined as the contract had been determined. Relying on Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd , it was held that Section 35(1) of CIPAA prohibits conditional payment terms and construed such to be void. However, the BM City appeal is presently pending in the Court of Appeal. The High Court decision in Jack-In Pile has recently been overturned in 2018 by the Court of Appeal which held that a conditional payment clause prior to the commencement of CIPAA remains valid and is not affected by section 35. It is believed that an application is being made to the Federal Court for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision.
[Updated]: Having held by the Federal Court, as per the ‘Jack-In Pile’ appeal in 2019, CIPAA could only apply prospectively thus a ‘conditional payment clause’ could effectively be enforceable for any construction contract came before 15th April 2014.
[Updated-02]: It is settled law that conditional payment is not allowed in CIPAA, prospectively. However, is this prohibition applied to all contract? In short, No, citing if Parliament wanted a prohibition to be generic, it would have amended the Contract Act 1950 and not CIPAA. Yet, in another case, it was held, prohibition on conditional payment would also apply in court proceeding, not just CIPAA. Similarly, prohibition in conditional payment is not limited to “pay when paid” clauses only but “Pay if certified” clauses will also be void.
 Bond M&E (KL) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd (Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd)  MLJU 376
 Khairi Consult v GJ Runding  MLJU 694
 Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd And Another Case  MLJU 2308
6) ZERORISING A PARTY’S CLAIM
Question, can the adjudicator awards the winning party Liquidated Damages LD? In Tenaga Poly Sdn Bhd vs Crest Builder Sdn Bhd (unreported), it was held that LD is not a ‘payment claim’ within the meaning of sections 4 and 5 of CIPAA, therefore party cannot initiate adjudication proceedings under CIPAA to recover LD. Any successful defence based on LD by a non-paying party will ‘zero-rise’ an unpaid party’s claim and no payment is to be made to the non-paying party.
7) NON CERTIFIED CLAIM
Question, can a party claim for payment based on progress of work that is not certified? In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd , the applicant sought to set aside the adjudication decision based on the argument that the payment claim was premature as the interim claims by the respondent were not certified. It was held that the adjudicator’s jurisdiction under sections 25 of CIPAA entitled him to decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued and to review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued. In the absence of certification, the non-paying party cannot deprive the unpaid party from availing the adjudication process.
8) EXEMPTION ORDER
Question, whether the expression encompasses construction contracts entered by statutory bodies and government-linked companies or is it to be limited to contracts entered into by the ‘Government’? In Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v Leighton Contractors (M) Sdn Bhd , it was held that for it to fall within the meaning of a ‘Government construction contract’, it must be one where the government, be it the Federal or State, is a party to it.
[Updated-02]: Besides that of ‘statutory body’, much clarity or sometimes, ‘confusion’ has been accorded for ‘storey’ now included ‘basement’. Occupancy has been given the widest interpretation to include residential or commercial.
 Tan Sri Dato' Yap Suan Chee v CLT Contract Sdn Bhd  MLJU 1964
 Liew Piang Voon v WLT Project Management Sdn Bhd  1 LNS 1105
9) CONSULTANCY CONTRACT
Question, can a consultancy contract be claimed under CIPAA? In Martego Sdn Bhd vs Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd [ 2017], it was held that architect rendering architectural services may claim his outstanding fees under CIPAA, notwithstanding the provision in the Architect’s Act. CIPAA applies to consultancy contracts which provide purely consultancy services. This judgement was re-affirmed by the Federal Court on 1st August 2019.
10) INTERIM OR FINAL?
Question, can the adjudicator determine on Final Account Claims in view of the ‘rough justice’ nature of CIPAA without ‘finality’? In Martego Sdn Bhd vs Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd [ 2017], it was held that CIPAA is applicable to disputes pertaining to interim claims and to disputes relating to final claims[vii]. The Federal Court, on 1st August 2019, referred to several Singapore Court decisions where the term of progress payment was wide enough to include the final payment. As long as there are payment claims relating to a construction contract, CIPAA would apply.
11) SETTING ASIDE
Question, under what grounds could the CIPAA decision be set aside? Section 15 of CIPAA provides limited grounds on which an adjudication decision may be set aside, namely:
(a) The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;
(b) There has been a denial of natural justice[viii];
(c) The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or
(d) The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction[ix].
The effect of setting aside as in Wong Huat Construction Co v Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd , it was held that the setting aside of an adjudication decision will restore all parties to their original positions and parties are free to adjudicate.
[Updated-02]: Fraudulently obtained adjudication decision has been given the strictest and narrow interpretation. This is applied to another case where evidence had been deliberately altered. Enforcement application under s.28CIPAA and payment by principal under s.30CIPAA can be applied simultaneously. Estoppel is not sufficient in and of itself, adjudicator must consider the merits of defence on the ground of estoppel, not entirely rely on estoppel to dismiss a defence. Adjudicator, in going into his own definition of ‘loss and expense’ as a Construction Professional, had failed to consider the contractual pre-requisites for a claim in loss and expense, had essentially re-written the contract instead of interpreting the terms therein.
 Rosha Dynamic Sdn Bhd v Mohd Salehhodin bin Sabiyee & Ors and other cases  MLJU 1222
 KPF Niaga Sdn Bhd v Vigour Builders Sdn Bhd and another case  MLJU 229
 Dekinjaya Builder Sdn Bhd v Chong Lek Engineering Works Sdn Bhd and another case  MLJU 2455
 Perbadanan Perwira Harta[n25]
 Perbadanan Perwira Harta[n25]
12) JURISDICTIONAL LIMIT
Adjudicator’s jurisdictions are limited to matters referred to in the payment claim and payment response, as prescribed in section 27(1) of CIPAA. However, the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd vs Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd  held that the adjudicator must now, also consider matters referred in an adjudication response even if such defences were not included in the payment response. In other words, respondent can raise new claims or defences post the payment response, allowing a possible ambush in view that the claimant has only 5 days to reply. Adjudicator who fails to consider the defences raised in the adjudication response could have acted in breach of natural justice and risked decision being set aside under section 15 of CIPAA.
[UPDATED-02]: It is settled that the adjudicator’s jurisdiction under s.25,CIPAA entitled him to decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued and to review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued. View Esteem has allowed issues not pleaded in the Payment Response to be adjudicated. Similarly, the same ought to be said that Payment Claim ought to be revisable and it does not bound by the amount set out in the Payment Claim. Errors in progress claims can be corrected in Payment Claim, including additional supporting document after submission of Payment Claim. Therefore, Adjudicator’s power under s.25CIPAA are discretionary. That also include discretion on quantum of costs. With finality on costs and fees, interest.
 Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd.  8 CLJ 728
 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd  1 LNS 1378
 Puncak Niaga Construction v Mersing Construction & Engineering 
 Seal Properties v Wabina Constructions & Engineering; P&A Management v WSH Development; Itramas Technology v Savelite Engineering; Pembinaan Melima v ATM Development
 MRCB Sentral Properties v GSIB
 Aston Star v Zumo Engineering
13) DOCUMENT ONLY ADJUDICATION?
Question, can either party request for hearing? In Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd vs Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd , respondent applied to set aside the adjudicator’s decision on ground that there had been a breach of natural justice as the adjudicator had failed to conduct a hearing. The court held that it is within the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to conduct a documents-only adjudication.
[Updated-02]: Adjudicator has the right not to allow hearing. However, this was overturned in another case, where Adjudicator must allow for hearing and cannot refuse hearing purely on the ground that time is limited. Latest finding conclude that Adjudicator did not contravene natural justice after considering the written submission of the parties, concluded that hearing is not required.
 Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd v Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd (and Another Originating Summons)  1 AMR 693
 Guangxi Dev & Cap Sdn Bhd v Sycal Bhd and another case  MLJU 878
 Mei He Development Sdn Bhd v Eosh Industries Sdn Bhd  MLJU 519
14) APPEAL ON ADJUDICATION DECISION ALLOWED?
Question, can party appeal on the adjudication decision on the ground of law? VVO Construction Sdn Bhd v Bina MYK Sdn Bhd , respondent appealed against the adjudication decision under Order 55A rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 and it was held that under CIPAA, there is no provision for appeal. If parties are allowed to appeal, it will contravene the purpose of CIPAA in disposing rough justice. In other word, you cannot adjudicate the same matter twice.
[Updated-02]: Parties are not allowed to raise new sets of defence, not contemplated in the adjudication, for setting aside application. However, in another case, parties are allowed to adduce new evidence in setting aside application.
 Hiform (M) Sdn Bhd v Tsr Bina Sdn Bhd and another summons  MLJU. 808; Punj Lloyd Sdn Bhd v Ramo Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case  11 MLJ 574; Gazzriz Sdn Bhd v Hasrat Gemilang Sdn Bhd  AMEJ 1630
 Bluedream City Development sdn bhd v Pembinaan Bina Bumi Sdn Bhd and another  MLJU 2531
15) SHIPPING AND MINING CONTRACT
In MIR Valve Sdn Bhd v TH Heavy Engineering Berhad , it is held that ‘ship building’ contract is excluded from CIPAA within the meaning of “construction work”. The similar judgment is held for YTK Engineering Services Sdn Bhd v Towards Green Sdn Bhd , where a shipping contract or a mining contract does not fall within the meaning of “construction work” under section 4.
16) OBJECTION OF ADJUDICATOR APPOINTMENT
In Zana Bina Sdn Bhd v Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd , it was held that party who participated fully in an adjudication proceeding without raising any objection as to the validity of the adjudicator’s appointment during the proceeding was estopped from raising the objection subsequently in its setting aside application. However, in a recent case of 2019, Mega Sasa Sdn Bhd vs Kinta Bakti Sdn Bhd and Others , the plaintiff seek to set aside the adjudication decision on ground that the adjudicator’s appointment was not valid for the reason that the appointing director of the AIAC has no locus standi in view that his position as the Director of AIAC is not legitimate in accordance to the Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation AALCO Host Country Agreement. The court has yet to make a judgement on this.
[Updated]: The High Court held that CIPAA does not violate Article 8(1) Federal Constitution. It also rejected the challenge, that CIPAA is a ‘usurpation of the judicial power of the court’ in violation of Article 121 Federal Constitution, reason being CIPAA is a judicial function and not a replacement of the courts' judicial power. It further affirmed that the acting director had the power and duty to appoint the adjudicator, regardless if his position as the ‘director’ has yet to be finalized.
[Updated-02]: Whether the parties must first attempt to agree on an adjudicator before a request for nomination from the Director of AIAC? Short answer, No. Similarly, court holds the validity of appointment by ‘acting’ Director of the AIAC, albeit impasse with its recognition from AALCO.
 KLIA Associates Sdn Bhd v Mudajaya Corporation Berhad  1 LNS 1253
 Prestij Mega Construction v Estate of Vinayak Pradhan BA-24C-13-02/2020 and BA-24C-25-03/2020
17) EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RESPONSE/REPLY
Question, whether there was a breach of natural justice when an adjudicator refused to allow the respondent’s application for extension of time to submit a payment response? In Binastra Ablebuild Sdn Bhd v JPS Holdings Sdn Bhd , it was held that it is not a breach of natural justice merely because an adjudicator, after hearing both sides, refused to allow the respondent’s application for extension of time. However, an adjudicator has the power under section 25(p) of CIPAA to extend any time limit.
18) CONSIDERING EXTENSION OF TIME (EOT) CLAIM BY ADJUDICATOR
Question, can the adjudicator jurisdiction extended to adjudicate extension of time EOT? Such matter arises when there is a jurisdictional challenge, as to what is the jurisdiction of the adjudicator under CIPAA?
19) LOSS AND EXPENSE CLAIMS (Read in Tandem with ZERORISING A PARTY’S CLAIM)
In Syarikat Bina Darul Aman Berhad & Anor vs Government of Malaysia , it was held that an adjudicator who decided that he had no jurisdiction to decide on loss and expense claims was in breach of natural justice as such claims came within the ambit of CIPAA as these claims were due to the delay in completion of works and therefore payable as part of the amount claimable for the additional costs incurred for work. Not all loss and expense claims are within the purview of CIPAA, ie. Claim for special damages.
The test is:
[UPDATED-02]: This matter is truly unsettled. Previously, Syarikat Bina Darul Aman allowed Loss and Expense claim (LnE) in CIPAA. However, if the LnE is not a provision of the contract, it cannot be awarded by the Adjudicator. This argument went further that HC held LnE is not a ‘payment’, thus not allowable in s.4,CIPAA.
  MLJU 2381 |  MLJU 673 |  1 LNS 559
 Kuasatek (M) Sdn Bhd v HCM Engineering Sdn. Bhd and other appeals  MLJU 1919
 Integral Acres Sdn Bhd v BCEG International (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases  MLJU 1889
20) PRE-AWARD INTEREST
In Milsonland Development Sdn Bhd v Macro Resources Sdn Bhd , it was held that an adjudicator has the power to grant pre-award interest pursuant to section 25(o) of CIPAA.
[Updated]: In Naza Engineering & Construction v SSL Dev , the High Court held that the adjudicator has exceeded his jurisdiction under s.27(1) read with s.5(1)CIPAA by awarding the 4th Pre-Award Interest Sum, of which it was not claimed in the Adjudication Claim. Also read Court’s Power to vary the Adjudication Decision.
21) WINDING UP BEFORE REGISTERING ADJUDICATION DECISION
In Likas Bay Precinct Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Sdn Bhd  , it was held by the Court of Appeal, that a successful claimant in adjudication need not have the adjudication decision registered before issuing a statutory notice of ‘winding up’ under section 465 of CA 2016[x].
[Updated]: In ASM Development v Econpile , the High Court granted an injunction restraining ‘winding up’ and held that the adjudication decision, which formed the basis of the ‘statutory demand’, had been disputed in an arbitration proceeding with cross-claims exceeding the amount in the adjudication decision on grounds that:
22) [UPADTED]: COURT’S POWER TO VARY THE ADJUDICATION DECISION
[Updated]: JEKS Engineering Sdn Bhd v PALI PTP Sdn Bhd  9 MLJ held in contrasts the decision of Naza Engineering & Construction v SSL Dev  that the court now has the power to severe any part of the AD as these were compelling and sensible on the grounds of in excess of jurisdiction by the Adjudicator. Such is against the earlier judgement of the HC, that Justice Wong KK held, ‘the court has no power to set aside a part of the AD under s.15CIPAA relying on BM City v Merger Insight . If the Parliament intended the court to have power under s.15 to vary the AD, Parliament would have to expressly provided for such analogues s.28(2)’. So, that is ‘unsettled’ as at the moment.
What is taken to be settled are one, court could not set aside AD on grounds of mistake in facts and/or in law; the court will not re-evaluate the evidence; and any reasons, brief as they may be, is taken as the adjudicator’s justification [a topic for another day]
In Naza Engineering & Construction v SSL Dev , the High Court contemplated whether it has the jurisdiction to vary the adjudication decision to only allow enforcement of the ‘enforceable portion’ of the decision or to set aside the adjudication decision entirely. Justice Wong KK in his judgement relied on:
23) [UPDATED-02] CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT – refers to ‘singular’ contract and not ‘contracts’. Unsigned quotation qualifies as a contract in writing for purposes of CIPAA.
 Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd  1 MLJ 311
 Ong Teik Beng (t/a MJV Construction) v Wow Hotel Sdn Bhd  8 MLJ 10
24) [UPDATED-02]: REJOINDER – Mirrored arbitration, CIPAA Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to allow for Rejoinder.
 Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Tri Pacific Engineering Sdn Bhd and another  MLJU 548
25) TIMELINE – ‘Working Day’ is generally construed as the ‘working day’ of where the site is located. However, the HC held that the ‘Working Day’ for the delivery of the Adjudicator’s Decision must be construed as the ‘working day’ of where the Adjudicator’s office is located. This law is, however unsettled, pending appeal. As to the definition of “Date” in s.5(2)CIPAA must necessarily mean “a calendar date or a statement by which the due (calendar) date for payment is capable of being identified” and not simply, “immediate” for “instantly”, “promptly”, “forthwith”, “at once” or “straight away”. On another matter, commencement of adjudication is upon appointment of adjudicator as compared to serving of the notice of adjudication.
 Perbadanan Perwira Harta Malaysia v Kuntum Melor Sdn Bhd and another case  MLJU 1593
 Granstep Development Sdn Bhd v Tan Chong Heng & Ors  MLJU 2364
26) BREACH OF CONTRACT – CIPAA is not the avenue for claims of damages from a breach of contract, notwithstanding one would be allowed to raise such claims as a cross-claim of defence or set-off against a Claimant’s claim.
27) ANSWER RIGHT QUESTION, WRONGLY – Courts are not concerned with merits or correctness of the decision. This include, erroneous assessment of documentary evidence. Therefore, Adjudicators are not bound by the disputes referred to them in the exact way as pleaded by the parties, especially with regard to the remedies sought.
28) NATURAL JUSTICE – The 1st rule of natural justice “overlaps with” but is “distinct from the Duty to be Impartial” envisaged by s.15(c)CIPAA, borne out in fact; and in the objective perception of a “fair-minded and informed observer”, i.e. there must be a “reasonable suspicion” or a “real possibility” that the adjudicator would be biased, either in fact or in perception; which also include ex-parte communication with the adjudicator.
 Hiform (M) Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Bukit Timah Sdn Bhd and another case  MLJU 2452
 Maju Holdings v Spring Energy; Acoustic & Lighting System v Les Engineering
 Ong Teik Beng[n10]
 First Commerce v Titan Vista  MLJU 376.
 Halliburton v Chubb  3 WLR 1474
 Rosha Dynamic Sdn Bhd v Mohd Salehhodin bin Sabiyee & Ors and other cases  MLJU 1222
As to date, CIPAA has been plagued with crippling complexities with more and more cases brought up in court for a finality in judgement that appears to be inconsistent and unpredictable in many areas beyond the true intention of CIPAA that is in dispensing justice based on the notion of to ‘pay first, argue later’ dispensing ‘rough justice’ with legally binding decision that has no ‘finality’ thus providing only temporal relief. The initial pro-claimant outcomes had thus swing to the other side of being pro-respondent post 2017.
As more cases move up to the court, as in Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd v PCP Construction Sdn Bhd , the court has gone as far as to interject the manner and efficacy of CIPAA in dispensing ‘rough justice’ and to the nature of AIAC being a ‘foreign entity’ with very little or no ‘check and balance’ self-regulation, had a monopoly grip on the dispensation of justice in Malaysia, no matter how ‘rough’ it is[xi]. The AIAC has since taken the same matter to the Federal Court to have this portion of the judgement expunged[xii].
The fate of CIPAA, while having put ‘off tangent’ from its initial purposes with more and more inconsistent and unpredictable judgements from the court, was plagued by alleged corruptions resulted in the former Director of the AIAC being replaced, based on the detailed insider content of just a ‘poison-penned’ letter[xiii]. However, in a recent case of 2019, Mega Sasa Sdn Bhd vs Kinta Bakti Sdn Bhd and Others , the plaintiff seek to set aside the adjudication decision on ground that the adjudicator’s appointment was not valid for the reason that the appointing director of the AIAC has no locus standi in view that his position as the Director of AIAC is not legitimate in accordance to the Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation AALCO Host Country Agreement. The court has yet to make a judgement on this.
CIPAA in itself is a two-tier processes. Winning the first-tier as in obtaining a favorable adjudication decision is not going anywhere with regards to recouping your unpaid payment claim. Subsequent enforcement of the decision as in the second-tier, is where the challenges begin as in setting aside and stay by the court. That is going to complicate matters, while many in the legal fraternity has been advocating, forget CIPAA, let’s see you in court!
[i] Craig J Enderbury, “Changes to the Construction Act: Payment certainty…uncertain terms”, Chartered Institute of Building CIOB (UK), reference from https://www.ciob.org/sites/default/files/Hill%20Intl%20CIOB%20slides.pdf
[ii] A survey was conducted to coincide with the Construction Industry Development Board’s plan to incorporate the survey’s outcomes in the Cabinet Paper which includes the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Bill 2006 which is targeted for submission to the Ministry of Works of Malaysia in March 2006, see M.S. Mohd Danuri , M.E. Che Munaaim , H. Abdul Rahman , M.Hanid, “LATE AND NON-PAYMENT ISSUES IN THE MALAYSIAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY – CONTRACTORS’ PERSPECTIVE”, Center for Project and Facilities Management, Faculty of the Built Environment, University of Malaya. Reference from https://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB4392.pdf
[iii] Philip Davenport, “SECURITY OF PAYMENT IN NEWZEALAND” reference from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUConstrLawNlr/2002/79.pdf
[iv] The seed of discontent has been raise as to the nature of the AIAC as the sole appointing body for adjudication under CIPAA is well reflected in the judgment of Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd vs PCP Construction Sdn Bhd, see “AIAC: Judge Hamid Sultan diverged from case facts in judgment”, Malaysiakini reference from https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/465089
[v] In attempts to challenge the jurisdiction of the adjudicator appointed by KLRCA under CIPAA 2012, the respondents in at least two adjudications have taken issue with the retrospective application of CIPAA 2012 to construction contracts entered into before 15 April 2014. UDA Holdings Berhad v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & MRCB Engineering Sdn Bhd (Originating Summons No: 24C-6-09/2014) (“UDA v Bisraya”) was heard together with Capital Avenue Development Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (Originating Summons No: 24C-5-09/2014) (“CAD v Bauer”). The applications were heard in the Construction Court of the Kuala Lumpur High Court and were decided by Mary Lim J on 31 October 2014. The grounds of judgment is reported as UDA Holdings Berhad v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & MRCB Engineering Sdn Bhd & Another Case  1 LNS 1584., “Construction Adjudication: Prospective, Retrospective or Somewhere in-between?” reference from https://mahwengkwai.com/construction-adjudication-prospective-retrospective-or-somewhere-in-between/
[vi] Read “Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Jack-In Pile (M) Sdn Bhd – CIPAA 2012 applies prospectively not retrospectively”, reference from https://www.zicolaw.com/resources/alerts/bauer-malaysia-sdn-bhd-v-jack-in-pile-m-sdn-bhd-cipaa-2012-applies-prospectively-not-retrospectively/”
[vii] The Federal Court in its grounds of judgment dated 1 August 2019 in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd decided on important points of law on adjudication and final payments under a construction contract. https://themalaysianlawyer.com/2019/08/13/case-update-federal-court-decides-on-final-payments-adjudication/
[viii] See WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd , the unilateral communication of the adjudicator was found to be a material breach of natural justice.
[ix] See Skyworld Development Sdn Bhd v Zalam Corporation Sdn Bhd, the Adjudicator had issued his Adjudication Decision one day out of time and this rendered the decision void.
[x] Reference from https://www.zainmegatmurad.com/2019/02/20/cipaa-adjudication-466-statutory-notice-winding-up/
[xi] Reference from http://judgments.my/ca/leap-modulation-sdn-bhd-v-pcp-construction-sdn-bhd-and-another-appeal/10309 and https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/465089
[xii] Read “AIAC: Judge Hamid Sultan diverged from case facts in judgment”, Malaysiakini, reference from https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/465089
[xiii] Read “AIAC director resigns over MACC investigation”, Edge Markets, reference from https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/aiac-director-resigns-over-macc-investigation
DYA+C is set up by Ar. DAVID YEK TAK WAI to undertake resolution of commercial disputes through ARBITRATION and ADJUDICATION, specializing in CONSTRUCTION PAYMENT DISPUTES.
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